| Week |
Subject |
Related Preparation |
| 1) |
• Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium
• Games in strategic form and iterated strict dominance
• Nash equilibrium
• Existence and properties of Nash equilibria |
Read corresponding section in book |
| 2) |
• Iterated strict dominance and rationalizability
o Iterated strict dominance: definition and properties
o An application of iterated strict dominance
o Rationalizability
o Rationalizability and iterated strict dominance
• Correlated equilibrium
• Rationalizability and subjective correlated equilibria |
Read corresponding section in book |
| 3) |
Extensive-form games
• Commitment and perfection in multi-stage games with observed actions
o Multi-stage games
o Backward induction and subgame perfection
o The value of commitment and time consistency
• The extensive form
o Definition of the extensive form
o Multi-stage games with observed actions
• Strategies and equilibria in extensive-form games
o Behavior strategies
o The strategic-form representation of extensive-form games
o The equivalence between mixed and behavior strategies in games of perfect recall
o Iterated strict dominance and Nash equilibrium
• Backward induction and subgame perfection
• Critiques of backward induction and subgame perfection
o Critiques of backward induction
o Critiques of subgame perfection |
Read corresponding section in book |
| 4) |
Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions
• Principle of optimality and subgame perfection
• A first look at repeated games
• The Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model
o A subgame-perfect equilibrium
o Uniqueness of infinite-horizon equilibrium
o Comparative statistics
• Simple timing games
o Definition of simple timing games
o The war of attrition
o Preemption games
• Iterated conditional dominance and the Rubinstein bargaining game
• Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria
o Definitions of equilibria
o A two-period example
o Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in games with many players
• Finite-horizon and infinite-horizon equilibria |
Read corresponding section in book |
| 5) |
Repeated games
• Repeated games with observable actions
o The model
o The folk theorem for infinitely repeated games
o Characterization of the equilibrium set
• Finitely repeated games
• Repeated games with varying opponents
o Repeated games with long-run and short-run players
o Games with overlapping generations of players
o Randomly matched opponents
• Pareto perfection and renegotiation-proofness in repeated games
o Introduction to Pareto perfection
o Pareto perfection in finitely repeated games
o Renegotiation-proofness in infinitely repeated games
• Repeated games with imperfect public information
o The model
o Trigger-price strategies
o Public strategies and public equilibria
o Dynamic programming and self-generation
• The Folk theorem with imperfect public information
• Changing the information structure with the time period |
|
| 6) |
Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium
• Incomplete information
• Providing a public good under incomplete information
• The notions of type and strategy
• Bayesian equilibrium
• Further examples of Bayesian equilibria
• Deletion of strictly dominated strategies
o Interim vs. ex ante dominance
o Examples of iterated strict dominance
• Using Bayesian equilibria to justify mixed equilibria
o Examples
o Purification theorem
• The distributional approach |
|
| 7) |
Bayesian games and mechanism design
• Examples of mechanism design
o Nonlinear pricing
o Auctions
• Mechanism design and the revelation principle
• Mechanism design with a single agent
o Implementable decisions and allocations
o Optimal mechanisms
• Mechanisms with several agents: feasible allocations, budget balance and efficiency
o Feasibility under budget balance
o Dominant strategy vs. Bayesian mechanisms
o Efficiency theorems
o Inefficiency theorems
o Efficiency limit theorems
o Strong inefficiency limit theorems
• Mechanism design with several agents: optimization
o Auctions
o Efficient bargaining processes
• Further topics in mechanism design
o Correlated types
o Risk aversion
o Informed principal
o Dynamic mechanism design
o Common agency |
|
| 8) |
Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and trembling-hand perfection
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in multi-stage games of incomplete information
o The basic signaling games
o Examples of signaling games
o Multi-stage games with observed actions and incomplete information
• Extensive-form refinements
o Review of game trees
o Sequential equilibrium
o Properties of sequential equilibrium
o Sequential equilibrium compared with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Strategic-form refinements
o Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
Proper equilibrium
|
Read corresponding section in book |
| 9) |
Reputation Effects
• Games with a single long-run player
o The chain-store game
o Reputation effects with a single long-run player: the general case
o Extensive-form stage games
• Games with many long-run players
o General stage games and general reputations
o Common-interest games and bounded-recall reputation
• A single big player against many simultaneous long-lived opponents
• MIDTERM |
Preparation for exam |
| 10) |
Sequential bargaining under incomplete information
• Intertemporal price discrimination: the single-sale model
o The framework
o A two-period introduction to Coasian dynamics
o An infinite-horizon example of the Coase conjecture
o The skimming property
o The gap case
o The no-gap case
o Gap vs. no gap and extensions of the single-sale model
• Intertemporal price discrimination: the rental or repeated-sale model
o Short-term contracts
o Long-term contracts and renegotiation
• Price offers by an informed buyer
o One-sided offers and bilateral asymmetric information
o Alternating offers and one-sided asymmetric information
o Mechanism design and bargaining
|
|
| 11) |
More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction and iterated weak dominance
• Strategy stability
• Signaling games
• Forward induction, iterated weak dominance and burning money
• Robust predictions under payoff uncertainty
|
|
| 12) |
Advanced topics in strategic-form games
• Generic properties of Nash equilibria
o Number of Nash equilibria
o Robustness of equilibria to payoff perturbations
• Existence of Nash equilibrium in games with continuous action spaces and discontinuous payoffs
o Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium
o Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium
• Supermodular games |
|
| 13) |
Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium
• Markov equilibria in specific classes of games
o Stochastic games: definition and existence of MPE
o Separable sequential games
o Examples from economics
• Markov perfect equilibrium in general games: definition and properties
o Definition of Markov perfect equilibrium
o Existence
o Robustness to payoff perturbations
• Differential games
o Definition of differential games
o Equilibrium conditions
o Linear-quadratic differential games
o Technical issues
o Zero-sum differential games
• Capital-accumulation games
o Open-loop, closed-loop and Markov strategies
o Differential-game strategies |
|
| 14) |
Common knowledge and games
• Knowledge and common knowledge
• Common knowledge and equilibrium
o The dirty faces and the Sage
o Agreeing to disagree
o No-speculation theorems
o Interim efficiency and incomplete contracts
• Common knowledge, almost common knowledge and the sensitivity of equilibria to the information structure
o The lack of lower hemi-continuity
o Lower hemi-continuity and almost common knowledge |
|
| 15) |
Final Exam |
None |
| |
Program Outcomes |
Level of Contribution |
| 1) |
Knowledge and ability to apply the interdisciplinary synergetic approach of mechatronics to the solution of engineering problems |
|
| 2) |
Ability to design mechatronic products and systems using the mechatronics approach |
|
| 3) |
Knowledge and ability to analyze and develop existing products or processes with a mechatronics approach |
|
| 4) |
Ability to communicate effectively and teamwork with other disciplines |
|
| 5) |
Understanding of performing engineering in accordance with ethical principles |
|
| 6) |
Understanding of using technology with awareness of local and global socioeconomic impacts |
|
| 7) |
Approach to knowing and fulfilling the necessity of lifelong learning |
|
ISTANBUL OKAN UNIVERSITY INFORMATION PACKAGE / COURSE CATALOGUE
